Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bahel, Eric; Sprumont, Yves
• 署名单位: Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Deakin University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.001
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 94-99
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Monotonic additive preferences; Decomposability; Participatory budgeting

摘要

We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic. Keywords: strategy-proofness; additive preferences; decomposability; participatory budgeting. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.