Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments - evidence from a natural field experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kassis, Mark; Schmidt, Sascha L.; Schreyer, Dominik; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; Max Planck Society; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.006
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 278-287
• 关键词: Dynamic tournament; Sports professionals; Psychological pressure; Value of decision rights; Penalty shoot-outs; behavioral economics

摘要

In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments - like R&D races - with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.