A theory of progressive lending *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dasgupta, Dyotona; Mookherjee, Dilip
• 署名单位: O.P. Jindal Global University; Boston University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.005
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 211-227
• 关键词: Dynamic contracts; borrowing constraints; moral hazard; Progressive lending; microfinance

摘要

We characterize Pareto efficient long term 'relational' lending contracts with one-sided lender commitment in a context where the borrower can accumulate wealth, has intertemporal consumption smoothing preferences, and the lender has some sanctioning power following default. We show the negative results of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) do not apply irrespective of the extent of sanctions, the borrower's preferences for smoothing, initial wealth or relative welfare weight. Borrowing, investment and wealth grow and converge to the first-best. Optimal allocations can be implemented by backloaded 'progressive' lending: a sequence of one period loans of growing size.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.