Bargaining: Nash, Consensus, or Compromise?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Xiangliang
• 署名单位: Nankai University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.011
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 730-742
• 关键词: Bargaining; Nash solution; consensus; compromise; No-cooperation; COOPERATION

摘要

We propose two solutions to Nash (1950)'s bargaining problem: the Consensus and Compromise solutions. They gradually diverge from the Nash solution. Regarding axioms, we decompose the Nash solution's Axiom IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) into distinct parts. The controversial ones are identified and successively replaced, leading to the Consensus and Compromise solutions. The two replacement parts are: 1). If the additional room for cooperation, resulting from deteriorating non-cooperation, does not offer a better outcome for both players, the solution remains unchanged; 2). A solution should not be the best only for one player, i.e., each player should make at least some concession, no matter how small.