Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Simin; Zhu, Xun
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Fudan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.017
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 454-479
• 关键词: Public goods; continuous time; Incremental commitments; announcements

摘要

We investigate a novel continuous-time mechanism in a public-goods game. In this game, a clock ensures that the contributions regularly increase within a fixed period for each player. The players can choose when to stop their contributions from increasing while others observe their actions in real time. We demonstrate, theoretically and experimentally, that such a mechanism effectively improves contributions. Three critical factors could cause improvement: announcements, incremental commitments, and the clock. We further decompose these factors and find that while announcements alone are ineffective, introducing incremental commitments and the clock can significantly improve contributions.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.