Auction design with heterogeneous priors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pham, Hien; Yamashita, Takuro
• 署名单位: National Economics University - Vietnam; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.002
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 413-425
• 关键词: Robust mechanism design; Worst case guarantee; Heterogeneous prior; auction; Foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms

摘要

We consider an auction design problem with private values, where the seller and bidders may enjoy heterogeneous priors about their (possibly correlated) valuations. Each bidder forms an (interim) belief about the others based on his own prior updated by observing his own value. If the seller faces uncertainty about the bidders' priors, even if he knows that the bidders' priors are within any given distance from his, he may find it worst -case optimal to propose a dominantstrategy auction mechanism.