Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsodikovich, Yevgeny; Venel, Xavier; Zseleva, Anna
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University; Luiss Guido Carli University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 137-159
• 关键词: switching costs; repeated games; folk theorem; stochastic games; Non-zero-sum games

摘要

We study how switching costs affect the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game.