Partnerships based on Joint Ownership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blonski, Matthias; Herbold, Daniel
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.007
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 183-202
• 关键词: Relational contracts; Joint ownership; property rights; RENEGOTIATION; Coase Theorem

摘要

In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a Strict Coasian Institution for which transaction costs impede an efficient asset reallocation after a breakdown. In contrast to Halonen (2002) the logic behind our results is that Joint Ownership maximizes the value of the relationship and the costs of renegotiating ownership after a broken relationship.