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作者：Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Saulle, Riccardo D.
作者单位：University of Turku; University of Liverpool; University of Naples Federico II; University of Padua
摘要：Rotation programs are widely used in our society. For instance, a job rotation program is an HR strategy where employees rotate between two or more jobs in the same business. We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. We introduce the notion of implementation in ordered cycles, where each ordered cycle is a rotation program for an assignment problem. When the designer would like to attain a Pareto efficient goal, we provide sufficient co...
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作者：Haupt, Andreas; Narayanan, Aroon
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Many economic decision-makers today rely on learning algorithms for important decisions. This paper shows that a widely used learning algorithm-epsilon-Greedy-exhibits emergent risk aversion, favoring actions with lower payoff variance. When presented with actions of the same expectated payoff, under a wide range of conditions, epsilon-Greedy chooses the lower-variance action with probability approaching one. This emergent preference can have wide-ranging consequences, from inequity to homogen...
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作者：Klein, Thilo; Aue, Robert; Ortega, Josue
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Queens University Belfast
摘要：This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank- ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system, we estimate complete ROLs assuming that parents do not use dominated strategies and that the matching outcome is stable. These estimates aid in constructing a counterfactual district-based assignment and discerning the factors driving parents' preferences over schools. We find that district consolidation leads to ...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Generoso, Nicolo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Yale University
摘要：The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' personal traits. Indeed, this representation does not model how the information given to players as per the rules of the game blends with players' cognitive abilities. We propose a representation of sequential games that explicitly describes the flow of information accruing to players rather than the stock of...
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作者：Bester, Helmut; Sakovics, Jozsef
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; Humboldt University of Berlin; Universitat de les Illes Balears; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition i...
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作者：Cantillon, Estelle; Chen, Li; Pereyra, Juan S.
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tongji University; University of Gothenburg; Universidad de Montevideo
摘要：A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another on...
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作者：Baier, Alexandra; Seelos, Sophia; Rittmannsberger, Thomas
作者单位：Free University of Bozen-Bolzano; University of Innsbruck; Technical University of Munich
摘要：This study addresses the emergence of (unarmed) peace and investments in arms within a guns- vs-butter conflict setting. We introduce a novel feature within the conflict game and separate the decision to start a conflict and the investment in arms, following the theoretical framework of Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2021). Based on this model we experimentally examine the emergence of peace while varying resource inequality among conflicting parties. We find that inequality leads to more conflicts...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We study indivisible goods allocation problems under constraints and provide algorithms to check whether a given matching is Pareto efficient. We first show that the serial dictatorship algorithm can be used to check Pareto efficiency if the constraints are matroid. To prove this, we develop a generalized top trading cycles algorithm. Moreover, we show that the matroid structure is necessary for obtaining all Pareto efficient matchings by the serial dictatorship algorithm. Second, we provide a...
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作者：Berczi, Kristof; Csaji, Gergely; Kiraly, Tamas
作者单位：Eotvos Lorand University; Eotvos Lorand University
摘要：The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet certain requirements. In such cases, one might be interested in modifying the instance so that the existence of a stable outcome with the desired properties is ensured. We focus on three different modifications. 1. In the stable roommates problem, we show that finding ...
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作者：Rohde, Linnea Marie
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome that perfectly reflects the majority's preference. This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preferences and to vote accordingly. I show that incentivizing participation with an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition. While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increase...
