Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Sinopoli, Francesco; Pimienta, Carlos
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.029
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 775-784
• 关键词: Poisson games; Undominated equilibria; Perfect equilibria

摘要

In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are ill dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium ill undominated strategies. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.