Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Konstanz; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 399-407
• 关键词: indirect reciprocity; reputation; Experimental economics

摘要

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows US to Study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.