Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: Yale University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 745-749
• 关键词: Matching; matching with contracts; substitutes; Law of aggregate demand; STABILITY; strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness

摘要

Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913-935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for doctors tinder these same conditions. That is, no group of doctors can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. We derive as a corollary of this result that no individually rational allocation is preferred by all the doctors to the doctor-optimal stable allocation. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.