Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Moulin, Herve; Laigret, Francois
署名单位:
Rice University
刊物名称:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN:
0899-8256
DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.002
发表日期:
2011
页码:
314-320
关键词:
cost sharing network connectivity Stand alone core
摘要:
We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.