Monotonicity of social welfare optima

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hougaard, Jens Leth; Osterdal, Lars Peter
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 392-402
• 关键词: Income allocation; MONOTONICITY; core; social welfare; Cooperative game

摘要

This paper considers the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to participation constraints. It is shown that for an income allocation method that maximizes a social welfare function there is a monotonic relationship between the incomes allocated to individual agents in a given coalition (with at least three members) and its participation constraint if and only if the aggregate income to that coalition is always maximized. An impossibility result demonstrates that there is no welfare maximizing allocation method in which agents individual incomes monotonically increase in society's income. Thus, for any such allocation method, there are situations where some agents have incentives to prevent society in becoming richer. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.