Drugs, guns, and targeted competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dubovik, Andrei; Parakhonyak, Alexei
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 497-507
• 关键词: Targeted competition; dynamic oligopoly; differential games; Drug wars

摘要

We consider a dynamic competition game involving three players, in which each player can vary the extent of his competition on a per-rival basis. We call such competition targeted. We show that if the players are myopic, then the weaker players eventually lose the game to their strongest rival. If instead the players are sufficiently far-sighted, then all three players converge in their power and stay in the game. We develop our model in application to drug wars, but the approach of targeted competition can be applied to competition between firms or political parties, or to warfare. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.