Asking questions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kos, Nenad
• 署名单位: Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 642-650
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Limited communication; Welfare maximization

摘要

We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.