Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vasconcelos, Luis
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 19-33
• 关键词: relationship-specific investment; asymmetric information; exclusivity

摘要

I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. The asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.