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作者：Dittmann, Ingolf; Kuebler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; Mechtenberg, Lydia
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Technical University of Berlin; University of Mannheim; University of Hamburg
摘要：We perform an experiment in which subjects bid for participating in a vote. The setting precludes conflicts of interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have only instrumental reasons to vote and form correct beliefs. Yet, we find that experimental subjects are willing to pay for the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can only be account...
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作者：Melo, Emerson
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In this paper we study the problem of price competition and free entry in congested markets. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian Traffic Equilibrium to establish the existence and...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Cobo-Reyes, Ramon; Jimenez, Natalia
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Granada; University of Exeter; Middlesex University
摘要：The notions of one's social identity and group membership have recently become topics for economic theory and experiments, and recent research has shown the importance of identity in a wide array of economic environments. But predictions are unclear when there is some trade-off between one's identity (e.g., race, gender, handedness) and potential monetary considerations. We conduct a public-goods experiment in which we permit endogenous group-formation. In a 2 x 2 design, we vary whether peopl...
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作者：Ioannou, Christos A.; Romero, Julian
作者单位：University of Southampton; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We propose a methodology that is generalizable to a broad class of repeated games in order to facilitate operability of belief-learning models with repeated-game strategies. The methodology consists of (1) a generalized repeated-game strategy space, (2) a mapping between histories and repeated-game beliefs, and (3) asynchronous updating of repeated-game strategies. We implement the proposed methodology by building on three proven action-learning models. Their predictions with repeated-game str...
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作者：Riella, Gil; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Universidade de Brasilia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Decision makers have a strong tendency to retain the current state of affairs. This well-documented phenomenon is termed status quo bias. We present the probabilistic dominance approach to status quo bias: an alternative is considered acceptable to replace the status quo only if the chances of a (subjectively) severe loss, relative to the status quo, are not too high. Probabilistic dominance is applied and behaviorally characterized in a choice model that allows for a range of status quo biase...
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作者：Masella, Paolo; Meier, Stephan; Zahn, Philipp
作者单位：University of Sussex; Columbia University; University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper investigates in a principal agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have hidden costs, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In bet...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：I consider first-price auctions (FPA) and second-price auctions (SPA) with two asymmetric bidders. The FPA is known to be more profitable than the SPA if the strong bidder's distribution function is convex and the weak bidder's distribution is obtained by truncating or horizontally shifting the former. In this paper, I employ a new mechanism design result to show that the FPA remains optimal if the weak bidder's distribution falls between the two benchmarks in a natural way. The same conclusio...
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作者：Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner
作者单位：Sami Shamoon College of Engineering; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the uncertain prize is not the lowest one, a player's effort as well as his expected payoff increase in his value for the uncertain prize. Otherwise, if this prize is the lowest one, we obtain that a player'...
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作者：Mu'alem, Ahuva
作者单位：Braude Academic College of Engineering
摘要：We address the common scenario where a group of agents wants to divide a set of items fairly, and at the same time seeks to optimize a global goal. Suppose that each item is a task and we want to find an allocation that minimizes the completion time of the last task in an envy-free manner, where no agent prefers anyone else's allocated task bundle over its own. This optimization goal is called makespan minimization, and the agents are often treated as machines. We give tight deterministic boun...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Essex
摘要：We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition ...
