First-best collusion without communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rachmilevitch, Shiran
• 署名单位: University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 224-230
• 关键词: Auctions; collusion; repeated games

摘要

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidder's valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the following holds: for every is an element of > 0 there is a nondegenerate interval Delta(is an element of) subset of (0, 1), such that if the bidders' discount factor belongs to Delta(is an element of), then there exists a Perfect Public Equilibrium with payoffs is an element of-close to the first-best payoffs. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.