Impulse balance in the newsvendor game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ockenfels, Axel; Selten, Reinhard
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.012
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 237-247
• 关键词: Newsvendor game; Impulse balance equilibrium; Ex-post rationality; Economic cognition; Behavioral operations management; experiment

摘要

One striking behavioral phenomenon is the pull-to-center bias in the newsvendor game: facing stochastic demand, subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand. We show that the impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a simple ex-post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, predicts the pull-to-center bias and other, more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.