On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kotowski, Maciej H.; Li, Fei
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.014
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 84-108
• 关键词: All-pay auction; war of attrition; budget constraints; common values; private values; affiliation; contests

摘要

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.