A competitive partnership formation process

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersson, Tommy; Gudmundsson, Jens; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu
• 署名单位: Lund University; Tilburg University; University of York - UK
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 165-177
• 关键词: Partnership formation; Adjustment process; equilibrium; Assignment market

摘要

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.