Mixed equilibria in runoff elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 619-623
• 关键词: Runoff voting; Mixed strategies; Hotelling-Downs

摘要

We demonstrate that the Hotelling Downs model with runoff voting always admits symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for any (even or odd) number of office-motivated candidates (provided they are at least four). In specific, (a) we show that the game does not admit any symmetric atomless equilibrium, (b) we fully characterize a class of symmetric atomic mixed equilibria which exist for any distribution of the voters' ideal policies and (c) we argue that these equilibria are more robust than pure strategy equilibria to introduction of uncertainty about the voters' preferences. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.