Committees with leaks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghosh, Saptarshi P.; Roy, Jaideep
• 署名单位: Shiv Nadar University; Murdoch University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 207-214
• 关键词: Leakage; career concerns; Informative voting; welfare

摘要

We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are 'leaked' with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.