X-games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 93-100
• 关键词: externalities; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes

摘要

What is common to the following situations: designing random incentive schemes to implement team effort, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which captures these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.