Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ortner, Juan
• 署名单位: Boston University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-16
• 关键词: Implementation; mechanism design; White lie aversion; Direct mechanisms

摘要

I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal degree of honesty. In particular, I assume that agents are white lie averse: they strictly prefer to tell the truth whenever lying has no effect on their material payoff. I show that if there are at least five agents who are all white lie averse and if I impose either of two refinements of Nash equilibrium, then a simple direct mechanism fully implements any social choice function. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.