Firing threats: Incentive effects and impression management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corgnet, Brice; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto; Rassenti, Stephen
• 署名单位: Chapman University System; Chapman University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Granada; University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.015
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 97-113
• 关键词: Firing threats; incentives; Impression management

摘要

We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job leisure surged. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.