The division problem under constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergantinos, Gustavo; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
• 署名单位: Universidade de Vigo; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 56-77
• 关键词: Division problem; single-peaked preferences

摘要

The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.