Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Wei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.013
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 26-35
• 关键词: Discontinuous game; asymmetric information; Bayesian expected utility; Finite payoff security

摘要

We introduce asymmetric information to games with discontinuous payoffs and prove new equilibrium existence theorems. In particular, the seminal work of Reny (1999) is extended to a Bayesian preferences framework. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.