Time and Nash implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Artemov, Georgy
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 229-236
• 关键词: Implementation; delay; time; social choice rules; Nash equilibrium

摘要

In this paper, we study the full implementation problem using mechanisms that allow a delay. The delay on the equilibrium path may be zero, an infinitesimally small number or a fixed positive number. In all these three cases, implementable rules are fully characterized by a monotonicity condition. We provide examples to show that some delayed implementable social choice rules are not implementable in Nash-equilibrium refinements without a delay. As an application of our approach, we characterize delayed implementable rules in environments where only the discounting changes between states. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.