Balancing the power to appoint officers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbera, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 189-203
• 关键词: Voting rules; Constitutional design; Strong Nash equilibrium; Rule of k names

摘要

Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.