Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stauber, Ronald
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 409-432
• 关键词: Extensive games; ambiguity; maxmin; backward induction

摘要

Based on a model where deviations from equilibrium play are assumed to identify irrational players who are characterized by ambiguous set-valued strategies, this paper introduces an equilibrium notion for extensive games with ambiguity averse players that yields a precise interpretation for the counterfactual reasoning usually associated with backward induction. The resulting equilibria are always Nash equilibria, but may not satisfy the conditions required for various refinements of Nash equilibrium, including those for subgame perfection. Existence of such equilibria is proved for all two-player games, and for N-player games with perfect information. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.