The strategically ignorant principal

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bedard, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 548-561
• 关键词: Value of information; Informed principal problem; mechanism design

摘要

The value of the principal's information is studied in a common value principal-agent model. We prove in a general environment that there is a nontrivial set of parameters for which the principal strictly prefers not to be fully informed, regardless of the equilibrium played. Importantly, we do not restrict the principal's offer-space, thereby allowing her to make full strategic use of any information she has. We also show that, among partitional information structures and given certain priors, the principal's optimal information structure groups together states in which her marginal payoffs are similar and separates states in which they diverge. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.