Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Serizawa, Shigehiro; Weymark, John A.
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 164-169
• 关键词: Strategy-proof social choice; Option sets; Additively separable preferences; single-peaked preferences; Generalized median voter schemes

摘要

For the provision of m >= 1 divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barber & agrave;, Mass & oacute;, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite.