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作者：Mauras, Simon; Pralat, Pawel; Vetta, Adrian
作者单位：Inria; Warsaw School of Economics; McGill University; McGill University
摘要：We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with n doctors and n hospitals, the doctor-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm gives doctors an expected rank of order logn for their partners and hospitals an expected rank of order n logn for their partners (Pittel, 1989; Wilson, 1972). This situation is reversed in an unbalanced market with n + 1 d...
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作者：Davies, Elwyn; Fafchamps, Marcel
作者单位：The World Bank; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic m...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Dong, Chris; Peters, Dominik
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to variable-electorate paradoxes, especially the reinforcement paradox (Young and Levenglick, 1978) and the no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988b). In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Condorcet extensions to these paradoxes for the case of exactly three candidates. F...
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作者：Holburn, Guy; Raiha, Davin
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Notre Dame
摘要：Organized public demonstrations of voter support for policy issues through rallies and petitions are mechanisms by which interest groups sometimes seek to influence political decision-making. We develop a voter-participation model of an interest group's strategic decision to publicly mobilize supportive voters through either a petition with zero participation cost or through a public rally with positive participation cost. Our model shows that voter mobilization can be influential when elected...
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作者：Heufer, Jan; Shachat, Jason; Xu, Yan
作者单位：Durham University; University of Groningen
摘要：We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance while controlling for idiosyncratic risk preferences. We construct a battery of portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems sharing a common budget set. A given bundle induces the same distribution over an individual's wealth in both problems. The portfolio choice solely reflects an individual's risk attitude, providing a benchmark to evaluate whether their wealt...
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作者：Morimoto, Shuhei
作者单位：Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness.In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result,...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
摘要：The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium, in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that when two populations of agents are randomly matched to play the hawk-dove game, then there is convergence to one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that pl...
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作者：Liu, Dongri; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：In this paper, we provide an implementation of the optimal mechanism of Es & ouml; and Szentes (2007) for their general environment without assuming constant marginal utility (in the first-stage type) for the buyers. Our implementation is carried out through a three-stage handicap auction. In stage 1, each buyer, knowing his first-stage type, is required to select a handicap menu by paying a menu fee. A higher menu fee would lead to a more favorable handicap menu, which charges a lower handica...
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作者：Kambe, Shinsuke
作者单位：Gakushuin University
摘要：We study the effect of the option to exit in finite-horizon, two-person bargaining where players make offers alternatingly and incur fixed costs per period. We show that players use take-it-or- leave-it strategies in the unique equilibrium when there is no discounting. Expecting a low payoff at the next period as a respondent, a proposer would choose to exit after her demand were rejected. This causes her opponent to accept her take-it-or-leave-it offer. This prediction is generically valid ev...
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作者：Karos, Dominik; Rachmilevitch, Shiran
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Haifa
摘要：Five classical and uncontroversial axioms-symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted mono- tonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity-characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the -th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.
