Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.010
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 276-292
• 关键词: intrinsic motivation; self-selection; incentives

摘要

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce social goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results show that social-good production more than doubles if incentives are low, but only if self-selection is possible. The analysis identifies a crucial role of incentives in the matching and coordination of motivated agents.