The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Galichon, A.; Jacquet, A.
署名单位：
New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.004
发表日期：
2025
页码：
333-344
关键词：
摘要：
Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum hide-and-seek games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge between non-TU matching problems and the theory of bimatrix games, with consequences notably regarding the computation of stable outcomes.