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作者：Strack, Philipp; Taubinsky, Dmitry
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the possibility of identifying time-inconsistent preferences in empirical designs where preferences are elicited in advance at time 0 and then again at time 1, after the agent receives additional information. For single-peaked preferences, time consistency is rejected only when the time-1 ranking between a pair of alternatives is always the reverse of the time-0 ranking. We establish variations and generalizations of this result. Since such stark reversals are rarely observed, choice-...
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作者：Sullivan, Michael Rolland
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This article develops techniques for the empirical analysis of repeated sequential search over unordered alternatives using data on consumer search processes. I use these techniques to assess why consumers conduct little search in e-commerce and often pay significantly above the minimum available price for a product. Search costs could explain these facts, as could pre-search seller differentiation: Consumers with low search costs may not visit stores they dislike based on information known be...
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作者：Vong, Allen
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：A firm trades with a sequence of consumers who are unsure about the firm's competence and its effort to supply quality. I examine rating systems that sustain efficient outcomes in virtually all trades by providing consumers with information to motivate a patient-competent firm's effort. I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for these systems to exist. I show that any such system censors the firm's track records, and explicitly construct one such system. This system reveals that th...
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作者：Liu, Ce; Wang, Ziwei; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Michigan State University; Peking University
摘要：Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms interact over time with short-lived workers. We show that when wages are flexible and firms are sufficiently patient, a dynamically stable solution always exists in many-to-one matching markets - even with complementarities and peer effects. Flexible...
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作者：Rachidi, Tobias
作者单位：Fraunhofer Gesellschaft; Fraunhofer Germany; Fraunhofer Applied Information Technology
摘要：This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms. There are multiple alternatives, and the voters have generalized single-peaked preferences derived from median spaces as introduced in Nehring and Puppe (2007b). This class of preferences covers a wide range of economically relevant domains, and it is much larger than the well-known single-peaked preferences on a line. I characterize the welfare-maximizing voting rules among all social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity...
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作者：Baumann, Leonie; Dutta, Rohan
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent's ex ante winning probability is monotone i...
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作者：Das, Kaustav; Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
作者单位：University of Leicester; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model with uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects: It may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect), increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect), and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). The model suggests mergers are more desirable when R&D outcomes are highly uncertain, but less so when the innovation...
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作者：Bhaskar, Dhruva
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：This paper studies monitoring in long-term, self-enforcing relationships with adverse selection and moral hazard. Monitoring is used to screen low types by incentivizing them to shirk. Once high types have been identified, monitoring is used both to incentivize effort from high types and to provide off-path (dis)incentives for low types looking to build a reputation. This results in a key trade-off: providing cost-efficient incentives to high types, versus screening low types faster. The optim...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Talgam-cohen, Inbal; Zabarnyi, Konstantin
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study information aggregation with a decision-maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information about a hidden state. While the decision-maker knows the prior distribution over states and the marginal distribution of each agent's recommendation, the recommendations are adversarially correlated. The decision-maker's goal is choosing a robustly optimal aggregation rule. We prove that for a large number of agents for ...
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作者：Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Osaka
摘要：We study an adverse selection environment in which a buyer's inferential ability is heterogeneous: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from a seller's offer, whereas a na & iuml;ve type is inattentive to the correlation between the seller's private information and the offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the seller's profits or trade surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is, all types of buyers trade. We then provide conditi...
