Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baumann, Leonie; Dutta, Rohan
• 署名单位: McGill University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230285
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: SOCIAL-NETWORKS; MARKET; games

摘要

A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent's ex ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adversarial disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no snitching and no discrimination. (JEL D82, D83, D85, Z13)