Self-Enforced Job Matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Ce; Wang, Ziwei; Zhang, Hanzhe
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; Peking University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240280
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Repeated games; folk theorem; long-run; STABILITY; equilibria; EFFICIENCY; MARKET

摘要

Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms interact over time with short-lived workers. We show that when wages are flexible and firms are sufficiently patient, a dynamically stable solution always exists in many-to-one matching markets - even with complementarities and peer effects. Flexible wages are crucial to our result, as they not only facilitate surplus extraction when firms cooperate in no-poaching agreements but also enhance the threat of punishment through bidding wars. (JEL C72, C73, C78, D21, D62, J31, J41)