Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Naïvety

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230019
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: equilibrium; INFORMATION; MARKETS; neglect; games

摘要

We study an adverse selection environment in which a buyer's inferential ability is heterogeneous: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from a seller's offer, whereas a na & iuml;ve type is inattentive to the correlation between the seller's private information and the offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the seller's profits or trade surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is, all types of buyers trade. We then provide conditions under which the menu mechanism is optimal among all general mechanisms. A consumer protection policy limiting the na & iuml;ve buyer's loss is also investigated. ( (JEL D18, D82, D86, D91)