Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.199
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 199-219
• 关键词: gastroenterology fellowship match; labor-market; EVOLUTION; DYNAMICS; DESIGN; time

摘要

Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple experiment, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding.