Contracting with Third Parties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baliga, Sandeep; Sjoestroem, Tomas
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.75
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 75-100
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; mechanism design; moral hazard; hold-up; RENEGOTIATION; implementation; collusion; INFORMATION

摘要

In bilateral holdup and moral hazard in teams models, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first best, even if renegotiation is possible. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and investment. This result holds even if the third party is corruptible, as long as the grand coalition has access to the same contracting technology as any colluding subcoalition. (JEL D86, D82)