Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fox, Jeremy T.; Bajari, Patrick
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.100
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 100-146
• 关键词: federal communications commission; rank correlation estimator; divisible good auctions; ascending-bid auctions; english auctions; MODEL; identification; assignment; collusion; synergies

摘要

We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)