Ideologues Beat Idealists

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghosh, Sambuddha; Tripathi, Vinayak
• 署名单位: Boston University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.2.27
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 27-49
• 关键词: Information aggregation; preferences

摘要

Our model considers a majority election between two candidates-an ideologue committed to a fixed policy and an idealist who implements the ex post choice of the majority. Voters are aware that their individual rankings of policies may change after the election according to common or idiosyncratic shocks. We show that in equilibrium the ideologue often beats the idealist, even when this choice hurts all voters. Inefficiency arises both for sincere and for strategic voters; we also show that it is more pervasive in the latter case. Groups may be inflexible even when each individual has a preference for flexibility. (JEL C72, D72)