Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Athey, Susan; Coey, Dominic; Levin, Jonathan
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.1.1
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; procurement; identification; COMPETITION; preferences; collusion; entry

摘要

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, with little efficiency cost. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design. (JEL D44, H57, L73, Q23)