Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calford, Evan M.; Cason, Timothy N.
• 署名单位: Australian National University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220111
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 236-266
• 关键词: voluntary contributions; winners curse; INFORMATION; PRIVATE; common; RISK; game

摘要

Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events , others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events , and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium , the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism. ( JEL C92, D71, D82, D91, H41 )