Strategic Incentives and the Optimal Sale of Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olivera, Rosina Rodriguez
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210372
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 296-353
• 关键词: coordination; acquisition; disclosure

摘要

A monopolist data seller offers information to privately informed data buyers. I characterize the seller's optimal menu, which screens between two types of buyers. Buyers' preferences for information allow the seller to extract all surplus, and the opti-mal menu's features are determined by the interaction between buyers' strategic incentives and the correlation of their pri-vate information. The seller offers perfect information to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and partial information,which makes this type indifferent. Both experiments are informative even when buyers have congruent beliefs if they have coordination (anticoordination) incentives and their private information is nega-tively (positively) correlated