Price and Choose

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Nunez, Matias
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230095
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: subgame-perfect implementation; allocation; partnership; DESIGN

摘要

We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns in defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price and Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a model without quasi-linear utility, to a setting with an outside option, robustness to max-min behavior, and caps on prices. (JEL C72, D11, D44, D71, D82)