The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Novak, Vladimir; Matveenko, Andrei; Ravaioli, Silvio
• 署名单位: National Bank of Slovakia; University of Mannheim; Cornerstone Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210352
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-39
• 关键词: rational inattention; preferences; DECISION; CHOICE; media; demand; choose; MODEL

摘要

We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex ante. We present how optimal information acquisition and subsequent belief formation depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically-in expectations over all possible signal realizations conditional on the state of the world- update away from the realized truth, and even agents with the same initial beliefs might become polarized. We design a laboratory experiment to test the model's predictions. The results confirm our predictions about the mechanism ( rational information acquisition) and its effect on beliefs ( systematic polarization), and they provide general insights into demand for information. ( JEL C92, D72, D83, D91)